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Armed Career Criminal Act: Whether Carrying a
Concealed Handgun Without a Permit Should be
Considered a Violent Felony
"I don't have to be careful, Igot a gun." Homer Simpson*
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a sentencing en-
hancement, provides that a "violent felony" includes "conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."'
Currently, various federal district and circuit courts disagree on
whether illegally carrying a concealed firearm constitutes a vio-
lent felony under the ACCA. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, as
well as the district court for the district of Kansas, hold that it is
not a violent felony. 2 The Eleventh Circuit, however, holds that it
is a violent felony.8 Interestingly, the United States Supreme
* The Simpsons: The Cartridge Family (Fox television broadcast Nov. 2, 1997).
t A.B., Franklin and Marshall College; J.D., summa cum laude, Thomas Jefferson
School of Law. Associate at Stock and Leader, LLP, York, Pennsylvania. The author
thanks Jennifer Dockter, Hayley Clair, Stephen Zeller, and Jessica Flynn for their thoughts
and advice on this article. And a special thank you to my wife, Beth, for her support of all
my pursuits.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).
2. United States v. Flores, 477 F.3d 431, 435-36 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that carrying
a concealed weapon is not a violent felony); United States v. Whitfield, 907 F.2d 798, 800
(8th cir. 1990) (holding that carrying a concealed weapon is not a violent felony); United
States v. Crawley, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1256 (D. Kan. 2002) (holding that carrying a con-
cealed weapon in violation of Mo. REV. STAT § 571.030.1(1) (2002) is not a violent felony).
3. United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398, 402 (11th cir. 1996) (holding that carrying a
concealed weapon is a violent felony under the ACCA). Hall has been questioned by United
States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008), which held that Begay v. United
States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), abrogated United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir.
1998); thus, carrying a concealed weapon is not a "crime of violence" under the United
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Court may have weakened the Eleventh Circuit's ruling. In Begay
v. United States,4 the Court held that driving under the influence
does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA.5 Because the
Court did not squarely address whether carrying concealed hand-
guns constitutes a violent felony, the issue remains.6
This article argues that carrying a concealed handgun is dan-
gerous, 7 and illegally carrying a concealed handgun should be a
violent felony under the ACCA. 8 Additionally, it recommends
Congress amend the ACCA's definition of "violent felony" so that it
applies uniformly to laws regulating the illegal carrying of con-
cealed handguns. Part 11 of this article introduces background
facts regarding the dangers of firearms, particularly emphasizing
handguns, which are very easily concealed. Part III discusses the
legislative history and relevant case law of the ACCA and Con-
gress's purpose and objective in enacting the legislation. Part IV
discusses the Supreme Court's recent decision in Begay v. United
States, which held that driving under the influence was not a vio-
lent felony.9 Part V applies Begay's rationale to violations for ille-
States Sentencing Guideline section 4131.2. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. And since a "crime of
violence" is identical to a "violent felony" under the ACcA, it is possible that Archer un-
dermined Hall. Id.
4. 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008).
5. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352 (holding that Begay abrogates United States v. Gilbert,
and since Gilbert relied on Hall, it is possible that Hall is abrogated); see also Hunter, 559
F.3d at 1190 (Archer "stated, in dicta, that carrying a concealed weapon is not a violent
felony under the [AccA].").
6. Even as recently as January 13, 2009, Justice Alito has included the issue of carry-
ing a concealed weapon as a circuit split. See Chambers v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 687,
694 n.2 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.).
7. See United States v. Carswell, 144 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (dictum)
(discussing that possession of a gun creates some risk that it will be used in violence);
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2005, at tbi. 7 (2006), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/offenses/expanded -informationldata/shrtable_-07.html [herei-
nafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORT]. Of the 14,860 recorded murders in 2005, 10,100 were
committed with a firearm. Id.
8. This article specifically argues that carrying a concealed handgun without a permit
is a violent felony under the ACCA. For an example of various ways to violate a concealed
handgun statute, see, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 57 1.030 (West 2003). There are generally
three ways to violate a concealed carrying law. One way is for a person with a permit to
carry concealed handguns to commit a strict liability, technical violation. For example, the
person may inadvertently walk~ within twenty-five feet of a polling station with a concealed
handgun. See, e.g., id. § 571.107(l)(2). The second way to violate a concealed carry law is
for a person to commit an improper act with a handgun. For example, the person possesses
or discharges a firearm while intoxicated. See, e.g., id. § 571.030(l)(5). A third way to
violate a concealed carry law is to carry a concealed weapon without ever receiving a permit
to do so. See, e.g., id. § 571.030(l)(1).
9. Begay, 553 U.S. at 148 ("We consequently conclude that New Mexico's crime of
'driving under the influence' falls outside the scope of the Armed Career Criminal Act's
603
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gaily carrying concealed firearms and argues that illegally carry-
ing a concealed firearm presents a serious potential risk of injury
to another, which is similar to the enumerated crimes of the
ACCA. Part VI proposes a new, extended categorical approach
that will focus on the dangerous elements of carrying concealed
handguns. Part VII proposes an amendment to the ACCA that
strengthens the ability to punish dangerous persons who carry
concealed handguns, and discusses how this amendment will lead
to a more satisfactory fulfillment of the AC CA's objectives.
II. THE DANGER OF HAND~GUNS
Firearms are dangerous because of their potential to create im-
mediate and devastating injury.10 A sampling of statistics from
several reports published by bureaus within the Department of
Justice confirms this. In 2005, for example, firearms were the
primary weapons used to commit murder in the United States,
accounting for nearly sixty-eight percent of all domestic murders.'1
In addition, just over forty-two percent of all robberies reported in
2005 were committed with a firearm. 12 Notably, most of these
firearms crimes were committed with handguns. 13 Indeed, seven-
ty-five percent of the firearms murders committed in the United
States were committed with handguns, making handguns the
weapon of choice in approximately half of all domestic murders. 14
Moreover, handguns were used in approximately sixty-four per-
cent of murders committed during robberies and forty-seven per-
cent of murders committed during burglaries. 15
Clause (ii) 'violent felony' definition. And we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
in relevant part and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion").
10. See United States v. Carswell, 144 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (dictum)
(discussing that possession of a gun creates some risk that it will be used in violence).
11. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS TABLE 7, supra note 7. Of the 14,860 recorded murders
in 2005, 10, 100 were committed with a firearm. Id.
12. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMES COMvMITTED WITH
FIREARMS, 1973-2006 (2006), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/guncrimetab.cfm.
13. Marianne W. Zawitz, Guns Used in Crime, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, July 1995, at 1, 4, available at
http:/Ibjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/GUIC.PDF (noting that Handguns predominate in
firearms crime, and that in 1994, more than three-quarters of the 85,132 guns traced by
the ATF were handguns). Criminals prefer handguns because they are concealable. Id. In
fact, the Maryland legislature found that a high percentage of violent crimes involve hand-
guns and that many deaths and injuries are the result of criminals carrying handguns in
public places. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 4-202 (LexisNexis 2002).
14. Id.
15. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2005, at tbl. 10 (2006), available at
604 Vol. 48
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While the use of firearms all too frequently occurs in these felo-
ny-type circumstances, they are also used, more often in fact, in
other circumstances.'16 For example, romantic triangles were re-
lated to 117 murders, fifty-two percent of which were committed
with a handgun.17 Brawls due to the influence of alcohol were re-
lated to 120 murders, thirty-five percent of which were committed
with a handgun.' 8 Brawls due to the influence of narcotics were
related to ninety-seven murders, sixty-one percent of which were
committed with a handgun.' 9 Arguments over money or property
were related to 211 murders, fifty-eight percent of which were
committed with handguns. 20 Astonishingly, other various argu-
ments were related to 3,692 murders, forty-eight percent of which
were committed with handguns.2 ' This means that a person is far
more likely to be killed by a handgun in connection with a brawl
or argument than from a rape, robbery, or burglary.22
111. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ACCA: TRACING THE ACT FROM ITS
ORIGINS TO ITS CURRENT STATE
Although many people in the United States have always viewed
gun control as a controversial issue,23 three significant acts of gun
violence in the 1960s brought national attention to the gun de-
bate.24 In 1963, John F. Kennedy was assassinated.25 Then in
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/offenses/expanded -informationldata/shrtable -1O.html [herei-
nafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORT]. This Report states that of the 921 murders from robbe-
ries, 698 were committed with a firearm, and 588 of those involved the use of a handgun; of
the 88 murders from burglaries, 51 were committed with a firearm, and 41 of those in-
volved the use of a handgun; and of the 44 murders from rapes, only 4 were committed with
a firearm, but 3 of those 4 involved the use of a handgun. Id.
16. See id. Of the 14,860 murders in 2005, felonies including but not limited to rape,
robbery, burglary, theft, arson, and narcotics violations constituted 2161 murders. These
are known as some of the more violent crimes, yet argument related conflicts resulted in
more homicides: romantic triangles, children killed by a babysitter, brawls induced by
drugs or alcohol, arguments, gang related activity, and other causes constituted 7044 mur-
ders. Id. See State v. chippey, 33 A. 438, 438 (1892) (dictum) (stating that persons who





21. UNIFORM CRIME REPORT TABLE 10, supra note 15.
22. See id.
23. See Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y,
Winter 1995, at 17, 17 (discussing America's first use of gun control and its ties to racism).
24. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the
Remainder Problem, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 837, 840 n. 12 (2008) ("In the 1960s after the
assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator
Summer 2010 605
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1968, both Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy were
assassinated.26 All three assassins used firearms. In response to
this gun violence, Congress enacted stringent gun control legisla-
tion. 27
A. Origins of the ACCA
In the late 1960s, Congress sought to increase public safety by
restricting dangerous individuals from owning guns.28 Congress
believed that restricting these individuals' ability to obtain fire-
arms would decrease violent crime. 29 Because of this belief, Con-
gress passed, inter alia, the Gun Control Act of 1968.30 The Gun
Control Act prohibited felons, and others deemed unsafe, from
owning firearms. 31
Later, Congress enacted the Armed Career Criminal Act of
1984, which amended the Gun Control Act and brought career
Robert F. Kennedy, it [gun control] became a major subject of' public passion and controver-
sy .. 1)
25. John F. Kennedy, 6 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDiA BRITANNICA: MICROPAEDIA 798 (15th
ed. 2003).
26. See David T. Hardy, The Firearms Owner's Protection Act: A Historical and Legal
Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 601-02 (1987) (discussing the impact of Martin Luther
King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy's assassinations on gun control laws).
27. See Katheryn L. Munger, Comment, Foreign Felons-Firearms and Beyond: The
Implications of Small v. United States and the Proposed Amendments to 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) (1), 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 467, 468-69 (2006) (discussing the impact of John F. Kenne-
dy's, Robert F. Kennedy's, and Martin Luther King Jr.'s assassinations on gun control
laws).
28. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974) (citing Pub. L. No. 90-351, §
1201, 82 Stat. 236 (1968), as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 301(a)(1), 82 Stat. 1236
(1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (2006)) ("When Congress enacted the provisions ... it
was concerned with the widespread traffic in firearms and with their general availability to
those whose possession thereof was contrary to the public interest.").
29. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 108 (1968) (Conf. Rep.) ("Congress had deter-
mined that the ease with which firearms could be obtained contributed significantly to the
prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States.")).
30. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
92 1-27 (2006)). Congress also passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in
1968. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5, 18 U.S.C.). Due to complex legislative procedures, both the Gun Control Act and the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act were passed in a short time -span. See Hardy,
supra note 26, at 603 ('The resulting legislation, under the now-familiar name of 'The Gun
Control Act of 1968,' supplanted both the earlier enactment of Titles TV and VII [of The
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act] and large portions of the National Firearms
Act.").
31. Cynthia R. Cook, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act Amendment: A Federal
Sentence Enhancement Provision, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 99 (1989).
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offenders within its scope. 32 Congress had determined that a li-
mited number of criminals were responsible for "an extraordinary
large volume of crime."33 Thus, the amendment's purpose was to
"curb armed, habitual (career) criminals.134 The ACCA of 1984
focused on habitual robbers and burglars because Congress be-
lieved that such crimes were some of the most damaging to socie-
ty3 5 and, thus, provided a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen
years for felons in possession of a firearm who had three prior
convictions for robbery or burglary. 36
In 1986, Congress passed the Firearms Owners' Protection Act
(FOPA), which recodified the ACCA as 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 37 Con-
gress believed the Gun Control Act of 1968, although it targeted
criminals, also allowed for prosecution of innocent citizens who
made slight and easily correctable mistakes. 38 The FOPA's pur-
pose was to relieve legally compliant firearm owners and dealers
from "unnecessary burdens under the Gun Control Act of 1968,"
while still providing law enforcement with the ability to fight vio-
lent crime. 39 The recodification of the ACCA at Section 924 estab-
lished the ACCA as a sentencing enhancement provision.40
Five months after enactment of the FOPA, the Career Criminals
Amendment Act of 1986 amended Section 924(e).4 ' The amend-
ment broadened the ACCA's application beyond the traditional
32. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006)). See Cook, supra note 31, at 102 (stating that the ACCA was add-
ed to section 1202(a) of the Gun Control Act of 1968).
33. H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3662.
34. Id. at 1.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, §§ 1801-1803 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
924(e) (2006)).
37. Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 26 U.S.C. (2006)). See also Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575, 582 (1990) (citing Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 458 (t986))
(noting the recodification of the ACCA); Firearms Owners' Protection Act: Hearing on H.R.
945 Before the H. of Rep., 99th Cong. - (1985) (statement of Larry Craig, Republican,
Representative of Idaho) ("It targets those who knowingly sell weapons to those who are
prohibited from owning them . .. as well as those who use them for purposes contrary to
the interests of our society.").
38. "[1] nnocent citizens ... who have done nothing wrong more criminal than to own a
gun or . . . [made] some slight mistake in a bookkeeping error that is easily correctable."
Firearms Owners' Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 945 Before the H. of Rep., 99th Cong.-
(1985) (statement of Larry Craig, Republican, Representative of Idaho).
39. H.R. REP. No. 99-495, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1327.
40. Cook, supra note 31, at 103.
41. Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1402, 100 Stat.
3207. The Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986 is part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, § 1402, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 15, 16, 18,
19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 31, 42, 47, 48 U.S.C.).
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categories of robbers and burglars. The ACCA would now include
violent offenders and drug dealers as well. 42 Congress's broaden-
ing of the ACCA focused on crimes inherently and potentially
dangerous because they result in physical injury to a victim. 43
The current ACCA's main components derive from this amend-
ment.44
In summary, the ACCA is a direct result of Congress's attempt
to curb gun violence. First, the Gun Control Act attempted to pre-
vent dangerous individuals from receiving firearms. The ACCA
followed, imposing severe penalties on the criminal use of fire-
arms. Finally, Congress enacted the FOPA, which had two pur-
poses: limit the burden of gun control laws on law-abiding citizens
and provide strong prosecution of felons in possession of fire-
arms.4
B. The Current ACCA
The ACCA is a sentencing enhancement provision aimed at
criminals who have previously committed specific felonies and
who illegally possess firearms. 46 In particular, an individual con-
victed of unlawful possession of a firearm receives a sentence en-
hancement if he has three previous convictions for either a "vio-
lent felony"~ or a "serious drug offense."147 The sentence enhance-
ment mandates a minimum of fifteen years in prison without pa-
role. 48 For purposes of the ACCA, a violent felony is any convic-
tion punishable by a term exceeding one year49 that either: (1)
42. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 583-84 (1990).
43. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 585-87.
44. Compare Career Criminals Act § 1402 with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). In particular, this
amendment added the residual clause, which is now § 924(e). Id.
45. Note that many courts have looked to the legislative history of the ACCA when
attempting to interpret § 924(e). These courts have found it mostly unhelpful. In Taylor v.
United States, Justice Scalia noted:
I join in the Court's opinion except for Part 11, which examines in great detail the sta-
tute's legislative history. The examination does not uncover anything useful . .. I can
discern no reason for devoting 10 pages of today's opinion to legislative history, ex-
cept to show that we have given this case close and careful consideration, We must
find some better way of demonstrating our conscientiousness.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 603 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
46. See § 924(e); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (clarifying the punishment requirements of
the ACCA).
47. § 924(e)-(e)(A) (defining a serious drug offense). Although a serious drug offense
qualifies as a predicate conviction under the ACCA, that aspect of the ACCA is beyond the
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"ha[s] as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another,"50 or (2) is a "bur-
glary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives or other-
wise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of phys-
ical injury to another."51 The italicized phrase is called the resi-
dual clause of the ACCA. 52 The specific crimes of burglary, arson,
extortion, and use of explosives are called the "enumerated
crimes" of the ACCA. 53
Application of the ACCA can be parsed into two distinct compo-
nents. First, the prior convictions must be punishable by impri-
sonment for more than one year.54 Congress has considerably
narrowed this component, however, by excluding certain business
crimes and misdemeanors punishable by a term of imprisonment
of two years or less.55
Second, the crime must be a "violent felony" or "serious drug of-
fense."5 6 In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court examined
whether burglary as defined by Missouri law sufficed as burglary
under the ACCA's enumerated crimes.57 Burglary is an enume-
rated crime because it is one of the specified crimes in the ACCA. 58
Each state, however, independently defines burglary and its pu-
nishment. Thus, a uniform categorical approach, as opposed to
various burglary definitions, was required to ensure that uniform
elements of burglary trigger the ACCA sentence enhancement. 59
50. § 924(e)(2)(B3)(i). Although such elements of force against another person qualify as
a predicate conviction under the ACCA, that aspect of the ACCA is beyond the scope of this
article.
51. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). The language, "burglary, arson or extortion,
involves the use of explosives," is referred to as the "enumerated offenses" under the
AccA's definition of a violent felony. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. at 148 (J. Scalia,
concurring). The language, "or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another," is referred to as the "residual clause" under the AccA's
definition of a violent felony. Id. It is under this language that carrying a concealed hand.
gun should be considered a violent felony. Id.
52. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 148.
53. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192.93 (2007).
54. Begay, 553 U.S. at 148; see also § 924(e)(2)(B).
55. 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) (2006). "[Amny Federal or State offense pertaining to anti.
trust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating
to the regulation of business practices" is not a crime with punishment exceeding one year.
§ 921(a)(20)(A). In addition, "[Amny State offense classified by the laws of the State as a
misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less" is not a crime
with punishment exceeding one year. § 921(a)(20)(B).
56. § 924(e). This article addresses only the violent felony prong of predicate offenses
under ACCA.
57. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
58. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
59. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598.602. Congress's language in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) meant the
generic version of the crimes of burglary, arson, and extortion. Id. at 589. Therefore, when
609
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Many different interpretations of burglary under the ACCA ex-
isted prior to Taylor. Some courts defined burglary according to
state law, while others used the common law definition.60 Still
others based their definition of burglary on the statutory prede-
cessor to the ACCA. 61 Others conducted case-by-case inquiries to
determine whether burglary, as defined by state statute, involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of injury to anoth-
er.62
According to Taylor, Congress intended certain specific ele-
ments to trigger the ACCA's sentence enhancement. 63 The Court
determined that Congress did not intend the meaning of burglary
to be dependent on individual state definitions 64 because such a
statutory interpretation allows for crimes labeled burglary in one
state to fall within the sentencing enhancements of the ACCA,
while crimes of a similar nature would fall outside the enhance-
ment simply because a different state's legislature labeled the
crime differently. 65 Congress did not intend for such "odd re-
sults."66 Rather, Congress had a "'.generic' view of burglary, rough-
ly corresponding to the definitions of burglary in a majority of the
States' criminal codes."6 7
Taylor then concluded that a categorical approach was the cor-
rect method to determine whether a state conviction for burglary
qualifies as generic burglary. 68 This categorical approach does not
look at particular facts underlying a conviction, but instead
"look[s] only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of
the prior offense" to determine if a generic burglary had oc-
curred.69
determining if a specific state's burglary, arson, or extortion statute qualified as a violent
felony under the ACCA, a court must compare the state's statute to the generic definitions
of such crimes. Id. at 598-602.
60. Id. at 580 n.2.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 588.
64. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590 (stating it was "implausible" for Congress to intend the
states to control the meaning of the federal statute's term).
65. Id. at 590-9 1.
66. Id. at 592-93.
67. Id at 598. "Generic" is a term of art used by the Taylor Court referring to the type
of crime Congress intended to be included as a violent felony. Id. The Court also rejected a
common law interpretation of burglary as Congress's intent because Congress did not in-
tend for antiquated versions of burglary to be a violent felony. Id. at 593-95 ('This Court
has declined to follow any rule that a statutory term is to be given its common-law mean-
ing, when that meaning is obsolete or inconsistent with the statute's purpose.").
68. Id. at 600.
69. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
610 Vol. 48
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Under limited circumstances, however, courts may consider
more than the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the
prior offense. In situations where the state statute has a broader
meaning than the generic offense, the court applies a modified
categorical approach. 70 The modified categorical approach allows
courts to look at charging papers and jury instructions to deter-
mine whether the jury found elements of the generic offense when
convicting the defendant. 71
Shepard v. United States clarified the modified categorical ap-
proach. 72 Shepard held that a court may not look at police reports
or complaint applications when determining whether the defen-
dant was convicted of the generic offense. 73 But courts may look
at statutory definitions, charging documents, written plea agree-
ments, transcripts of the plea colloquy, and any explicit factual
finding by the trial judge assented to by the defendant while en-
tering a plea. 74
In summary, Congress attempted to enact gun control legisla-
tion that allowed for gun ownership by law-abiding citizens while,
at the same time, penalizing criminal use and criminal possession
of guns. The ACCA furthers these objectives by deterring career
violent felons from firearm possession and subjecting them to
longer prison sentences. Generally, courts apply a categorical ap-
proach to the ACCA and refrain from delving into the specific facts
of the prior convictions. But in narrow circumstances, when the
statute provides for some conduct that qualifies as a violent felony
and other conduct that does not qualify as a violent felony, a court
applies the modified categorical approach by examining other evi-
70. See, e.g., United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that
when the court looks to not only the conviction, but also information such as the jury in-
structions, it is called the "modified categorical approach"); United States v. Cook, 26 F.3d
507, 509 (4th Cir. 1994) (looking to extra information in addition to the conviction because
it was unclear whether the use of force was present while committing the obstruction of
justice).
71. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. The Court gives an illustration of this situation as well.
Suppose that a state statute for burglary includes entry of an automobile or entry into a
building. Entry of the automobile does not constitute generic burglary; however, entry of
the building constitutes generic burglary. The court may look to the charging documents
and the jury instructions to determine the specific subsection of the statute which convic-
tion resulted from. Id.; see also United States v. Cadieux, 500 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2007)
(holding that illegal entry into an aircraft is not included in the generic definition of bur-
glary).
72. 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
73. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16.
74. Id.
Summer 2010 611
612 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 48
dence concerning which elements of the statute resulted in convic-
tion.
C. A Review of Case Law Addressing Whether Carrying a Con-
cealed Handgun Constitutes a Violent Felony
Presently, there is a circuit split regarding whether carrying a
concealed handgun presents a serious risk of physical injury to
another, i.e., whether it is a violent felony.75 In United States v.
Whitfield, the Eighth Circuit held that carrying a concealed wea-
pon is not a violent felony.76 The Eighth Circuit determined that
"although carrying an illegal weapon may involve a continuing
risk to others, the harm is not so immediate as to present a se-
rious potential risk of physical injury to another.177
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Flores, agreed with Whit-
field and held that carrying a concealed weapon was not a violent
felony.78 The Flores Court reasoned that a violent felony required
active conduct or use, rather than simple possession. 79 The court
cited United States v. Oliver in support of this proposition, which
held that a felon in possession of a firearm did not present a se-
rious potential risk of physical injury to another.80 The court fur-
ther noted Michigan's allowance of citizens to carry concealed
weapons, if they have a permit to do so, as proof that such activity
was not overtly dangerous. 81
75. Compare Hall, 77 F.3d at 402 (holding that carrying a concealed weapon is a vio-
lent felony under the ACCA), with United States v. Whitfield, 907 F.2d 798, 800 (8th Cir.
1990) (holding that carrying a concealed weapon is not a violent felony), United States v.
Crawley, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1256 (D. Kan. 2002) (holding that carrying a concealed
weapon and a violation of Mo. REV. STAT § 571.030.1(1) (2002) is not a violent felony), and
United States v. Flores, 477 F.3d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that carrying a con-
cealed weapon is not a violent felony). Although the Eleventh Circuit later held in Archer
v. United States that carrying concealed handguns is not a crime of violence, the court still
held that it presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person. Archer,
531 F.3d at 1350. And, Archer applied a United States Sentencing Guidelines statute, not
the ACCA. Id. at 1348. Thus, the circuit courts are still split on whether carrying con-
cealed handguns present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
76. Whitfield, 907 F.2d at 800.
77. Id.
78. Mlores, 477 F.3d at 435, 38.
79. Id. at 436.
80. See id. at 437 n.3 (citing United States v. Oliver, 20 F.3d 415, 417 (11th Cir. 1994)
(holding that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is not a crime of violence)). Many
courts have held that a crime of violence is synonymous with a violent felony. See id. (stat.
ing that crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 4B1.2 (2006) is identical to violent felony under
the ACCA); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 47 (1993) (holding that possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon is not a crime of violence).
81. flores, 477 F.3d at 438.
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The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas similarly held
in United States v. Crawley that carrying a concealed weapon is
not a violent felony.82 The Crawley court concluded that "the im-
minence or likelihood of violence associated with a person carrying
a weapon is [not] appreciably different from that presented when
the weapon is simply otherwise readily available to a person."83
Contrarily, in United States v. Hall, the Eleventh Circuit held
that carrying a concealed weapon is a violent felony because it
went beyond the mere possession of a firearm and is an active-
conduct crime.84 "Active conduct" simply means that the conduct
involves "exerting will on the external world."185 The court distin-
guished active conduct from mere possession, because a weapon
could be possessed constructively and safely in a felon's base-
ment.86 Conversely, carrying a concealed weapon requires the ad-
ditional step of keeping the gun available for immediate use
against another person.87
IV. BEGAY V. UNITED STATES: A RECENT SUPREME COURT
DECISION CONCERNING THE ACCA's RESIDUAL CLAUSE
In Begay v. United States, the Supreme Court held that driving
under the influence is not a violent felony under the ACCA. 88 In a
six-to-three decision, the Court focused on two issues for determin-
ing whether a particular act constitutes a violent felony: (1)
82. Cawley, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1256.
83. Id. at 1256. The court's reasoning is creative, yet flawed. It is true that there is no
more risk from a person carrying a gun compared to a person stationary with a gun at their
immediate disposal. Note the use of the word stationary, because a person cannot be mo-
bile with a gun immediately at their disposal unless they are carrying it. This, however, is
an incorrect application of the ACCA. Contrary to the district court's assumption, risk is
not measured in a vacuum. The measurement of risk is the ordinary amount of risk than is
a result of the conduct. Certainly the probability of harm from a person carrying a con-
cealed handgun is higher that the probability of harm from a person stationary with a
handgun at their disposal in the ordinary situation. See James v. United States, 550 U.S.
192, 208 (2007) ("[Not] every conceivable factual offense covered by a statute must neces-
sarily present a serious potential risk of injury before the offense can be deemed a violent
felony."). Also, carrying a concealed handgun is distinguishable from possession with im-
mediate accessibility because carrying a concealed weapon involves the extra step of active
conduct of carrying the weapon. See Hall, 77 F.3d at 402 (holding that carrying a concealed
weapon is a violent felony under the ACCA).
84. Hall, 77 F.3d at 401.
85. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 337 (9th ed. 2009).
86. Hall, 77 F.3d at 401 ('The pertinent language of the ACCA does not include simple
possession of a firearm.").
87. Id. (stating that the weapon must be "on or about the person" meaning physically
on the person and readily accessible by him).
88. Begay, 553 U.S. at 148.
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whether the conduct presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another, and (2) whether the conduct is similar to the
enumerated offenses. 89 The Court found that the first issue was
satisfied because driving under the influence presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.90 But driving under
the influence was still not a violent felony because it is not similar
to the enumerated offenses.91
To determine whether a crime is similar to the enumerated of-
fenses of the ACCA, the Court introduced three characteristics
common to the enumerated offenses-the conduct must be pur-
poseful, violent, and aggressive. 92 The Court focused on the of-
fender's intent when analyzing the purposeful characteristic. The
Court opined that the crime of driving under the influence is more
similar to a strict liability crime, as opposed to an intentional
enumerated crime such as extortion. 93 Thus, the Court concluded
that the offender did not have the level of intent necessary for an
enumerated crime.94 The Court also noted the public policy be-
89. Id. at 142 (stating that the enumerated crimes presence "indicates that the [resi-
dual clause] covers only similar crimes, rather than every crime that 'presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another"'). Begay also noted that "a strict liability crime,
differs from a prior record of violent and aggressive crimes commriitted intentionally such as
[the enomerated crimes] ." Id. at 148. The Court also noted that "ftihese considerations
taken together convince us that "to give effect ... to every clause and word" of this statute,
we should read the examples as limiting the crimes that clause (ii) covers to crimes that are
roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves." Id.
at 1585 (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). See also United States v.
Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58-60 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying the Begay test in two phases).
Begay also appears to answer questions regarding the doctrine of ejusdem generis.
Prior to Begay, ejusdem generis was a contested aspect of the residual clause of the AcCA.
See Neal Eriksen, Note, Criminal Law-7Te Meaning of Violence: An Interpretive Analysis
on Whether A Prior Conviction For Carrying A Concealed Weapon is a "Crime of Violence"
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 801, 826-29 (2007).
Ejusdem generis provides that "when a general phrase follows a list of specifics, it should be
read to include only things of the same type as those specifically enumerated." James v.
United States, 550 U.S. 192, 199 (2007). The James Court addressed this topic and noted
that the common trait of the enumerated crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, and explo-
sives is that they "create significant risks of bodily injury or confrontation that might result
in bodily injury." Id. Yet, some argued that the common trait is active conduct. See Erik-
sen, supra at 826-29. Either way, carrying concealed handguns suffices these requirements
because it presents a significant risk of bodily injury and is an active crime. Regardless,
the Begay Court elaborated on the common trait of causing risk of injury, and includes
purposeful, aggressive, and violent conduct as common traits of the enumerated violent
felonies. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-145. Thus, the focal point of similarity is now Begay's
three characteristics, not whether the crime is active conduct.
90. Begay, 553 U.S. at 141.
91. Id. at 141-42.
92. Id. 553 U.S. at 145.
93. Id.
94. Id. The court concluded that "unlike the example crimes, the conduct for which the
drunk driver is convicted . .. need not be purposeful or deliberate." Id.
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hind the ACCA as an additional consideration when determining
purposefulness. 9 5 The majority explained that the ACCA's pur-
pose is to focus on criminals who are more likely to use a firearm in
committing a crime.96 Since driving under the influence is a strict
liability crime, which is also removed from the nature of firearm
crimes, the Court determined that driving under the influence is
not a valid indicator of a criminal's likelihood to use a firearm in
the execution of a future crime.97
To determine whether a crime is violent or aggressive, the Court
focused on whether the crime demonstrates the type of criminal
who is more likely to deliberately use a gun against a victim while
committing a crime in the future. 98 The Court discussed the enu-
merated crimes to determine whether this characteristic is
present.99 Furthermore, the Court focused on the level of intent
necessary to commit an enumerated violent and aggressive crime,
stating that the enumerated crimes have a higher degree of culpa-
bility than mere negligence. 100 And this higher degree of culpabil-
ity demonstrates that the criminal is the type of person who might
deliberately shoot someone. 01 The Court concluded that driving
under the influence is different from the enumerated crimes be-
cause it is a strict liability crime, and driving under the influence
is not "associated with a likelihood of future violent, aggriessive,
and purposeful 'armed career criminal' behavior." 10 2 Therefore, if
the past crime was intentional and not too far removed from a
firearms crime, then it is indicative of a likelihood to use a firearm
in the future commission of a crime. 103 Since the elements of pur-
95. Begay, 553 U.S. at 146 (noting that the act focuses on what particular types of of-
fenders use guns). In particular, "[Amn offender's criminal history is relevant to the ques-
tion whether he is a career criminal, or, more precisely, to the kind or degree of danger the
offender would pose were he to possess a gun." Id.
96. See id. at 146-47.
97. Id. at 146. After listing crimes such as polluting, the Court noted that "[wie have
no reason to believe that Congress intended to bring within the statute's scope these kinds
of crimes, far removed as they are from the deliberate kind of behavior associated with
violent criminal use of firearms." Id. Note that the Court mentions pollution and crimes of
negligence as too far removed. The Court did not list any crimes involving guns as too far
removed. Id.
98. Id. at 146.
99. Id. (analyzing the degree of risk of injury and intent included with the enumerated
crimes).
100. Begay, 553 U.S. at 145-46.
101. Id. Courts have also noted that the analysis for whether the conduct was aggres-
sive dovetails with the issue of whether there was an intentional act. Herrick, 545 F.3d at
59. (finding that purposeful "involves a degree of intent").
102. Begay, 553 U.S. at 148.
103. See id. at 146-47.
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poseful, violent, and aggressive were missing, driving under the
influence is not similar enough to the enumerated crimes to be a
violent felony.104
The Begay case was quite surprising. It was already difficult to
determine which crimes sufficed as a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another, and the Court inserted an extra layer
of analysis by requiring the three characteristics of purposeful-
ness, violence, and aggressiveness. And the majority was not
faithful to the ACCA because it merely invented these characteris-
tics out of thin air. 105 Furthermore, the three characteristics are
difficult to apply because they are similar to each other. In fact,
the Court focused only on intent when analyzing whether driving
under the influence was purposeful, violent, and aggressive. 106
Without further guidance from the Court, it appears that intent is
the underlying requirement for the three characteristics to be
present.
Even more surprising, this rule completely reversed the Court's
recent holding that the residual clause was independent from the
enumerated crimes in that it does not require the offense to
"9present Io as great a risk as any of the enumerated offenses."107 In
Begay, the Court ignored this precedent by declaring that the re-
sidual clause must be similar to the enumerated crimes in both
"kind as well as in degree of risked posed."108 Additionally con-
cerning, the majority inexplicably came to this conclusion by citing
an established, non-controversial canon of statutory construction,
which states that all language in the statute must be given proper
effect. 109 The ACCA's residual clause had existed for over twenty
104. Id. at 148.
105. See id. at 150 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[The problem with the Court's holding today
is that it is not remotely faithful to the statute that Congress wrote. There is simply no
basis . .. for holding that the enumerated and unenumerated crimes must be similar in
respects other than the degree of risk that they pose."). Justice Scalia also noted that "the
requirement of 'purposeful, "violent," and "aggressive" conduct was one that the Court
invents.". Id. at 153.
106. Id. at 145-48.
107. James, 550 U.S. at 209.
108. Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 143 (emphasis added).
109. Id. The Court stated:
These considerations taken together convince us that, "'to give effect ... to every
clause and word"' of this statute, we should read the examples as limiting the crimes
that clause (ii) covers to crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree
of risk posed, to the examples themselves.
Id. (quoting Duncan, 533 U.S. at 174).
Vol. 48616
Summe 2010Carrying Concealed Handguns61
years, and the only authority for the majority's three characteris-
tics test came from an antique canon of statutory construction. 110
For this canon of statutory construction to create three new
elements means that the Court inadvertently neglected to apply
this canon over the past twenty years. And it is questionable that
applying this canon should result in the specific characteristics of
purposeful, violent, and aggressive. The Court previously held
that the similarity between the residual clause and the enume-
rated crimes was that the conduct "creates significant risks of bo-
dily injury or confrontation that might result in bodily injury.""1
Without clarification, the Court determined that the similarity
was no longer a significant risk of injury, but was the ambiguous
three characteristics. The newly created characteristics, without
any reference to past precedent, is concerning.
Furthermore, the purpose of this canon of construction is to en-
sure that words in the statute are given their proper effect, and
not treated as mere surplusage.112 Holding that the residual
crimes must be the same kind and degree of risk as the enume-
rated crimes renders the statute's use of "otherwise" a mere sur-
plusage."13  The word "otherwise" indicates that the residual
crimes are of a different, other kind."14 But it does not mean that
they are of a different degree of risk."15
110. Researching the authority for interpreting the ACCA led to even more interesting
results. Duncan does not even involve interpretation of the ACCA. Duncan, 533 U.S. at
174 ("[Hlold[ing] that an application for federal habeas corpus review is not an 'application
for State post-conviction or other collateral review'. .. ). Although Duncan clarifies the
canon of statutory construction, it certainly does not explain how using this method of
statutory construction leads the Court to conclude that the residual clause must be "rough-
ly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves." Begay,
553 U.S. at 143.
111. James, 550 U.S. at 199.
112. Duncan, 573 U.S. at 173-75.
113. See James, 550 U.S. at 218-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia clarifies that
"otherwise," as used in the residual clause, means causing a serious risk of physical injury
to another, but in a different manner or in another way, as compared to the enumerated
crimes. Id. By requiring the residual crimes to be of the same kind, Begay has rendered
"otherwise" as useless.
114. Id. ("Mhe most natural reading of the statute is that committing one of the enume-
rated crimes (burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving explosives) is one way to com-
mit a crime 'involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another';
and that other ways of committing a crime of that character similarly constitute 'violent
felonies."').
115. Id. ("In this case, the application of the principle suggests that what the residual
provision means by the general phrase 'conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another' is conduct that resembles, insofar as the degree of such risk is
concerned, the previously enumerated crimes.") (emphasis added).
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The Court has done more than protect the enumerated crimes
from surplusage; the Court has imposed restrictions onto the resi-
dual clause. This is not giving all words their proper effect: This is
the use of ejusdem generis, which is a canon of statutory construc-
tion that applies when there is a specific list of items (enumerated
items) followed by a broad item.116 Oddly, the Court analyzed
ejusdem generis in 2006 and held that the restricting trait im-
posed on the residual crimes was that they must pose a significant
risk of bodily injury. 17 Justice Scalia's dissent asserted that the
majority's connection between the enumerated crimes and the re-
sidual clause was too imprecise, and the lower courts would need
more guidance."18 His analysis did not use the canon of construc-
tion used by Begay; it used ejusdem generis. 19
V. AN APPLICATION OF BEGAY: DEMONSTRATING THAT CARRYING
A CONCEALED HANDGUN PRESENTS A SERIOUS POTENTIAL RISK OF
PHYSICAL INJURY, AND THAT IT SATISFIES THE THREE
CHARACTERISTICS OF A VIOLENT FELONY
Generally, carrying a concealed handgun consists of three ele-
ments.120 First, the person must knowingly possess the hand-
gun.'2 ' Second, the handgun must be concealed. 22 Finally, the
handgun must be accessible for immediate use. 23 The first ele-
ment is important because it demonstrates a higher level of intent
116. Pitt County v. Hoteiscom, L.P., 553 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2009) ("'where general
words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general
words will ordinarily he presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular
designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those
specifically enumerated."') (quoting Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80 (1985)).
117. James, 550 U.S. at 199 (majority opinion).
118. Id. at 216-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. See Eriksen, supra note 89, at 818-19 (stating that the three elements for carrying a
concealed firearm are: (1) knowingly possessing the firearm, (2) the firearm must be con-
cealed, and (3) the firearm must be "readily accessible" for use).
121. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(A) (West 2010) ("[A] person commits
misconduct involving weapons by knowingly ... "(emphasis added)).
122. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18 12- 105(1)(b) (West 2010) ("[The firearm must
be] concealed on or about his or her person.").
123. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(a) (West 2010) (stating that weapon must be
"otherwise readily available for use"). The legal definition of "carrying," "concealed," or
"immediate use" is beyond the scope of this article. Currently, there is a split among states
regarding the elements of concealment, immediate use, and other issues such as whether
the gun is operable or loaded. See generally Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Fact that Gun
was Broken, Dismantled, or Inoperable as Affecting Criminal Responsibility under Weapons
Statute, 81 A.L.R. 4th 745 (2010) (discussing these legal issues).
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than negligence. 124 The second and third elements are also impor-
tant because they demonstrate active conduct and that the crime
is a continuing, dangerous crime.
A. Presents a Serious Potential Risk of Physical Injury: Begay's
First Prong
To determine whether the conduct presents a serious risk for
potential injury, courts consider the possibility of physical injury
from completion of the crime as well as the dangers present dur-
ing the crime. 12 5 In addition, courts focus on the inherent dange-
rousness of the crime, rather than the specific means used by the
defendant in committing the crime. 126 There is no requirement
that "every conceivable factual offense covered by a statute must
necessarily present a serious potential risk of injury before the
offense can be deemed a violent felony." 127 The correct inquiry is
whether the ordinary offense presents a serious potential risk of
injury to another.128 There need not be a "metaphysical certainty"
of injury; all that is necessary is a potential risk of injury. 129 The
court evaluates the degree of risk or probability that the prohi-
bited conduct will result in physical harm. 130
1. The Inherent Danger of Unlawfully Carrying a Concealed
Handgun as a Violent Felony
As early as 1892, State v. Chippey recognized that "the carrying
of concealed deadly weapons" is dangerous, because many people
have poor temperament and hastily use handguns.131 The Chip-
124. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) (1985) (implying that there is a hierarchy of culI-
pability, and knowingly is more culpable than negligence).
125. James, 550 U.S. at 203-04.
126. See United States v. Lancaster, 501 F.3d 673, 675 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated, 129 S.
Ct. 991 (2009) (holding that crime of escape is a violent felony).
127. James, 550 U.S. at 206.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the crime
of horse race fixing usually does not involve violence, and therefore the potential for injury
is low; therefore, horse race fixing is not a crime of violence); United States v. Billups, 536
F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that it is the probability of violence, not the inevita-
bility of violence that is to be considered, and not every factual manifestation must require
the act to be dangerous).
131. See State v. Chippey, 33 A. 438, 438 (1892) ("Iliecause the persons becoming sud-
denly angered, and having such a weapon in their pocket, would be likely to use it, which in
their sober moments they would not have done, and which could not have been done had
not the weapon been upon their person."). Chippey also held that a determination of a
violation of carrying concealed weapons statutes requires a fact-based evaluation depend-
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pey court's fear was legitimate. Although persons unlawfully car-
rying concealed handguns may use sound judgment, this is often
not the case. 132 The statistics discussed in Part 11 of this article
demonstrate how often poor judgment is used with firearms. 33
The very nature of carrying a concealed firearm is dangerous. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York reasoned that without a gun, the gun violence cannot occur,
and "it is the ammunition and the gun which, together, pose the
greatest risk of violence." 34
The inquiry for whether an activity presents a "serious risk of
physical injury to another" is not whether the crime could have
been committed in a safe manner; it is whether the ordinary viola-
tion creates a serious potential risk of injury. 35 Individuals dem-
onstrate by the very nature of utnlaw fully carrying a handgun that
they cannot make mindful, sound decisions and that they do not
feel obligated to abide by the law. Because illegal carriers of con-
cealed handguns make poor decisions and handguns are inherent-
ly dangerous, it should qualify under the ACCA as a serious risk
of potential injury to another person.
The Flores Court mistakenly concluded that concealed hand-
guns are not overtly dangerous because Michigan issues permits
to allow such activity, and carrying a concealed handgun does not
include active conduct. 36 These arguments are flawed. Simply
because a select group of citizens are deemed safe to carry con-
cealed handguns does not mean the activity is not overtly danger-
ous under other, more common circumstances. Clearly, a trained
professional with a concealed handgun is less dangerous than a
ing on the circumstances. Id. "Sober," in this context, means that the actor has self-
control. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1516-17 (9th ed. 2009).
132. For an example of such a situation where the unlawful carrier of a handgun was
attempting to use sound judgment, see Eriksen, supra note 89, at 801, hypothesizing a
situation where a wife attempts to obtain a license for carrying a concealed handgun due to
fear for her life from her husband. The processing time for the wife to receive the license
for carrying a concealed handgun is simply too long for her to wait, and she begins carrying
a concealed handgun without a permit. Please note, although this person attempted to use
sound judgment, there is no reason to believe that she has the capacity, knowledge or tem-
perament to carry a concealed handgun in a safe manner.
133. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
134. United States v. Carswell, 144 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[B]y defini-
tion, without possessing a gun, one cannot use a gun for the commission of a violent act;
with a gun, one can."). It additionally held that mere possession of guns or ammunition
was a crime of violence as defined within the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3156 (a)(4)(B).
Car-swell, 144 F. Supp.2d. at 133.
135. James, 550 U.S. at 209.
136. Mlores, 477 F.3d at 435-36 (holding that carrying a concealed weapon is not a vio-
lent felony).
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mentally unstable criminal in possession of a handgun. And
handguns are extremely dangerous, even when possessed by ordi-
narily responsible people. They are the most common instrument
used to commit murder and are the preferred weapon of crimi-
nals.137 In addition, carrying a concealed handgun is an active
crime, and the danger is more extensive than mere possession be-
cause the person has taken the additional step of keeping the
handgun within their possession for immediate use on others.138
2. Carrying Concealed Handguns and the Violent Felony of
Escape: Two Continuing Crimes that Present a Serious
Risk of Potential Injury to Another
In United States v. Franklin, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that the crime of escape is a violent
felony under the ACCA.139 The court stated, "[F] very escape sce-
nario is a powder keg, which may or may not explode into violence
and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, but
which always has the serious potential to do SO."140 Regardless of
the details, escape is inherently dangerous because there is a con-
tinuing public threat.' 4 '
Similar to escape, carrying a concealed handgun without a per-
mit is a continuing crime lasting the entire time the criminal is
carrying the concealed weapon.142  It creates a present risk of con-
frontation and the potential to cause serious bodily injury at all
moments. The risk of deadly confrontation would likely not exist
137. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text; see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw §
4-202 (West 2010).
138. Hall, 77 F.3d at 401 ("[C]arrying a concealed weapon is an active conduct crime: the
danger of carrying a concealed weapon extends beyond mere possession-the person has
taken the extra step of having the weapon immediately accessible for use on another.").
Hall has been questioned by Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352, which held that Begay abrogated
United States v. Gilbert; thus, carrying concealed weapons are not "crimes of violence," or
"violent felonies."
139. United States v. Franklin, 302 F.3d 722, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2002). For a recent case
decided after Begay, see United states v. Charles, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D.Kan. 2008)
(holding that even after Begay, escape is still a violent felony). But see United States v.
Nichols, 563 F.Supp.2d 631, 638 (S.D.W.Va. 2008) (holding that walk-away escape is not a
violent felony in light of the recent Begay decision).
140. Franklin, 302 F.3d at 724 (quoting United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142
(10th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 723-24.
142. See United States v. Crawley, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1256 (D. Kan. 2002) (holding
that carrying a concealed firearm is not a crime of violence, because carrying a concealed
firearm is no more dangerous than a handgun otherwise readily available to a person). The
Crawley Court, however, agreed that carrying a concealed firearm is a continuing crime.
Id.
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but for the carrying of the concealed handgun. 48 Similar to es-
cape, special precautions are irrelevant while the crime is occur-
ring. The details of the crime are not important because the crime
inherently has the potential for physical injury to another.
Recall that Whit field and Flores held that carrying a concealed
handgun is not a violent felony because such conduct is not the
type of harm that is immediate, and it does not present a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another. 44 These holdings are
incorrect because carrying a concealed handgun has the same type
of serious potential risk of injury as escape. If escape has the risk
necessary to be a violent felony, then carrying a concealed hand-
gun does as well.145
3. You Talking to Me?: Why Certain People with a Con-
cealed Handgun Are Dangerous
Not only is handgun possession inherently dangerous, but cer-
tain individuals in possession of handguns are more dangerous
than others. 46 State legislators have recognized this. In many
states, intoxicated or unstable violators of concealed handgun sta-
tutes are punished with longer sentences.147 In addition, many
states prohibit unstable or criminal persons from obtaining a per-
mit to carry concealed handguns. 48 The Ninth Circuit has even
held that possession of an unregistered firearm is presumptive
evidence of unlawful violent intentions. 49 Thus, under the ACCA,
143. Carswell, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
144. Whit field, 907 F.2d at 800 (holding that carrying a concealed weapon is not a vio-
lent felony); Flores, 477 F.3d at 435 (holding that carrying a concealed weapon is not a
violent felony).
145. Whitfield and Flores of the Eighth and Sixth Circuit respectively have both held
that escape is a violent felony under the ACCA or a crime of violence. See Franklin, 302
F.3d at 724 (holding that crime of escape is a violent felony); United States v. Nation, 243
F.3d 467, 472 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that every escape is a crime of violence).
146. See Hines v. State, 578 S.E.2d 868, 872 (Ga. 2003) (holding that felony possession of
a firearm is inherently dangerous depending on the facts and circumstances).
147. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (Vernon 2010) (giving higher punishment
to an intoxicated person).
148. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2 308(E)(1)-(20) (West 2010) (stating that many types
of persons, including unstable persons and criminals are prohibited from obtaining carrying
concealed handgun permits).
149. United States v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "possession
of an unregistered firearm is presumptive evidence of unlawful violent intentions and
therefore involves the substantial risk of violence necessary to label the possession a crime
of violence").
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when certain people violate concealed firearm statutes, it should
be classified as a serious potential risk of physical injury. 150
All but two states permit some people to carry concealed hand-
guns.151 In addition, Congress recognizes that certain people are
not qualified to handle firearms and prohibits such persons from
possessing firearms. 52 Persons without a permit to carry con-
cealed handguns have not been deemed safe or qualified by the
state to carry a concealed handgun and may even be criminals.15 3
As previously noted, many criminals carry concealed handguns for
criminal purposes. 154 It is dangerous for a person with criminal
intentions to carry a concealed handgun. Similar to possession of
an unregistered firearm, carrying a concealed handgun without a
permit should be considered evidence of unlawful violent inten-
tions.155 Therefore, carrying a concealed handgun has a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.
Also, recall Begay, which found that driving under the influence
is not a violent felony; however, it still presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.156 Begay adheres to the concept
that some people are more dangerous than others because Begay
observed that some drivers, those under the influence of alcohol,
are more dangerous than other drivers. 157 The level of risk from
illegally concealed handguns and drunk drivers is very similar. A
drunk driver is dangerous because he or she cannot operate the
150. Earlier aspects of this article emphasized that the ACCA does not take the specific
circumstances and underlying facts of the previous conviction into account when determin-
ing if it is a violent felony. Accordingly, a court does not have to look to the circumstances
or facts of the conviction because the definition of the concealed handgun statute will most
likely describe the underlying circumstances. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2 1-4201 (2010) (de-
scribing in great detail the different circumstances that constitute a violation of a carrying
concealed handgun statute in Kansas).
151. All states have permits available for carrying concealed weapons except for Alaska,
Illinois, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Illinois and Wisconsin do not allow citizens to carry
concealed weapons and thus does not issue permits. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 941.23 (West 2005)
and 720 Il1. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/24- 1(a)(4) (West 2010). Alaska and Vermont allow everyone
to carry concealed weapons, and thus do not issue permits either. See ALASKA STAT. §
11.61.220 (2007) (weapons misconduct); § 11.61.210 (same); § 11.81.250 (classification of
offenses); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (2007) (carrying dangerous weapons); see also Erik-
sen, supra note 89, at 838.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (prohibiting fugitives, drug addicts, mentally infirm, illeg-
al aliens, dishonorably discharged military persons, stalkers, and people found guilty of
domestic violence crimes from possessing firearms or ammunition).
153. For an example of prerequisites and qualifications for obtaining a permit to carry a
concealed handgun, see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.101 (West 2010).
154. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
155. Id.; see also Dunn, 946 F.2d at 621.
156. Begay, 553 U.S. at 141.
157. See id. (noting the alarming amount of injuries from alcohol related accidents).
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vehicle as safely. Similarly, persons without a permit to carry
concealed handguns have not been deemed safe or qualified to
handle such weaponry. Unlawfully carrying a concealed handgun
presents more serious potential risks than driving while intox-
icated because, unlike a drunk driver, one of the purposes for car-
rying a concealed handgun is to use the firearm in the commission
of a crime.' 58
B. Begay's Second Prong, Three Characteristics of a Violent Fe-
lony: Purposeful, Violent, and Aggressive
Unlike driving under the influence, carrying a concealed hand-
gun is similar to the enumerated crimes because it demonstrates
both the requisite level of intent and a likelihood of committing
future crimes of violence and aggression; therefore, it should be
considered a violent felony. Carrying a concealed handgun with-
out a permit is similar to the enumerated crimes regarding the
offender's intent and purpose because most statutes require the
offender to knowingly carry the concealed handgun. 59 This higher
level of intent is similar to the enumerated crimes language, "use
of explosives." The Supreme Court noted that use inherently de-
monstrates a higher degree of intent than negligence or accidental
conduct.' 60 Therefore, carrying a concealed handgun has the re-
quisites of purpose and intent because illegally carrying a con-
cealed handgun includes a degree of intent higher than strict lia-
bility and negligence.
The last two characteristics of the enumerated crimes, likelih-
ood of violence and aggression, are met as well. Carrying a con-
cealed handgun without a permit demonstrates the likelihood of
committing future crimes with firearms because it is an intention-
al crime that is not too far removed from gun violence.'16 ' One in-
dicator of future violent, aggressive, and career criminal behavior
158. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
159. See Eriksen, supra note 89, at 818 (stating that knowingly possessing the handgun
is a requirement for some carrying concealed handgun violations). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(A) (2010) ("[A] person commits misconduct involving weapons by
knowingly ... "(emphasis added)). [Georgia Code Ann. § 16-11-126 is another one, hut I
guess it isn't necessary b/c of the signal, see, e.g.]
160. Begay, 553 U.S. at 1586 (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)).
161. Id. at 144-45 (noting that the ACCA's purpose is to determine which criminals are
likely to use a gun).
624 Vol. 48
Surnmer 010 Carrying Concealed Handguns62
is illegally carrying a concealed handgun. 62 In many cases, carry-
ing a concealed handgun without a permit is the first step towards
violent and aggressive armed criminal behavior. Certainly, un-
lawfully carrying concealed handguns is a type of crime that is
associated with being an armed career criminal.
Baltimore, Maryland, for example, is the nation's second dead-
liest city in terms of per-capita homicides. 63 A study of the 107
people charged with murder in 2008 showed that there had been
380 prior arrests related to guns.' 64 These same 107 people had
only ninety-nine prior arrests related to drugs. 65 Based on this
study, it appears that firearm violations are a stronger indication
than drug arrests of a person's likelihood to commit murder.
Thus, the characteristics of violence and aggression are also
present.
Unlawfully carrying a concealed handgun, compared to driving
while under the influence, demonstrates a higher likelihood of us-
ing a firearm in the commission of a future crime. It passes the
three new characteristics introduced in Begay and presents a se-
rious potential risk of physical injury to another. Therefore, it
should be a violent felony under the ACCA.
C. Shooting Oneself in the Foot: How the Archer Court Incorrect -
ly Applied Begay
United States v. Archer weakens Hall's holding that carrying a
concealed handgun is a violent felony.' 66 In Archer, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari to a case where the
defendant's sentence was enhanced because of a prior conviction
for carrying a concealed handgun. 67 This sentencing enhance-
ment was under the United States Sentencing Guidelines defini-
tion of "crime of violence", as opposed to the ACCA After granting
certiorari to Archer, the Court remanded the case to the Eleventh
162. See supra note 13 (Surveys of inmates show that they prefer concealable, large-
caliber guns and juvenile offenders appear to be more likely to possess semi-automatic
weapons than adult offenders.).
163. Peter Hermann, Delving More Deeply Into Shooting Stats, THE BALTIMORE SUN,




166. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1351-52 (holding that carrying a concealed weapon under Flori-
da law is not a "crime of violence." Thus, Gilbert v. United States is abrogated, and Hall
might be abrogated as well.).
167. Id. at 1348-49.
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Circuit in light of the recent Begay decision, and the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that carrying a concealed handgun is not a "crime of vi-
olence."' 68
The Archer Court relied on four main reasons in reaching this
holding. First, the court noted that carrying a concealed handgun
without a permit is a passive crime. 69 Second, carrying a con-
cealed weapon is not universally considered a violent felony. 70
Third, unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon is not a violent
felony.'7 ' Fourth, the court noted that carrying concealed hand-
gun violations under Florida law did not require purposeful con-
duct. 172
The first reason is not very persuasive. As previously ad-
dressed, illegally carrying a concealed handgun is not a passive
crime because the carrying of the handgun is the overt act.' 73
Likewise, the second reason is unpersuasive as well. Simply be-
cause the majority of jurisdictions punish concealed handgun
crimes with terms less than one year does not conclusively mean
that the crime is not dangerous and violent. Additionally, violent
felonies are determined by the risk of violence to another, as op-
posed to whether the crime in itself is violent. 174 The third reason
is equally unpersuasive. A felon in possession of a firearm is dis-
tinguishable from a felon carrying a concealed handgun because
carrying a concealed handgun, unlike felony possession, specifical-
ly focuses on the active conduct of carrying the weapon rather
than constructive possession. 175 The last reason, that Florida law
did not require purposeful conduct, is valid. The handgun need
not be carried purposefully under Florida law.'176 But many states
include knowing as the level of intent when committing the
crime.177 The requisite level of intent may preclude Florida's car-
168. Id. at 1351-52.
169. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1351.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1352.
172. Id. at 1351 (citing Dorelus v. State, 747 So.2d 368, 372 (Fla. 2000)).
173. See supra Part V.A. 1.
174. Consider the fact that burglary is a violent felony. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Yet burglary
in itself is not violent. What makes burglary violent is the risk that a violent crime will
occur as a result of the burglary. See James, 550 U.S. 192, 207-08 (2007).
175. See Hall, 77 F.3d at 401, abrogated by Hunter, 559 F.3d 1188.
176. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.01 (West 2010) (lacking an intent requirement). See also
Archer, 531 F.3d at 1351 (noting that Florida's carrying concealed handgun statute does not
require intent).
177. See Eriksen, supra note 89 at 818. (stating that knowingly possessing the handgun
is a requirement for most carrying concealed handgun violations). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
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rying concealed handgun law from passing the Begay test; howev-
er, other state statutes will pass the Begay test.178
Begay and Archer, do not abrogate the Eleventh Circuit's hold-
ing that carrying concealed handguns present a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another. In fact, Begay found that driv-
ing under the influence presented a serious risk of physical injury
to another person)'79 And Archer held that carrying concealed
handguns, although not a crime of violence, also presented such a
risk. 180 Thus, Begay and Archer did not reject that carrying a con-
cealed handgun presents a serious risk of physical injury to
another. This type of dangerous risk is the crux of a violent felo-
ny. But after Begay, presenting a serious risk of physical injury to
another is not enough; the Court has implied other requirements
to the finding of a violent felony.
Whether carrying a concealed handgun is a violent felony is still
unresolved because there is still a circuit split over whether carry-
ing a concealed handgun presents a serious potential risk of phys-
ical injury to another. Also, it is uncertain how courts across the
country will apply Begay. In Archer, the Eleventh Circuit applied
Begay to find that carrying a concealed handgun is a serious po-
tential risk of injury and still is not a crime of violence, but stare
decisis from Archer is limited to carrying concealed handgun viola-
tions arising under Florida law.' 81 And Archer interpreted the
U.S.S.G., as opposed to the ACCA.'82 Even though the crime of
violence under the U.S.S.G. has been construed as synonymous to
a violent felony under the AC CA,183 the Archer holding is not di-
rectly on point to vacate Hall.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(A) (West 2010) ("[A] person commits misconduct involving weapons
by knowingly..."(emphasis added)) and Georgia Code Ann. § 16-11-126 (West 2010)..
178. See generally 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 11 (2008) (discussing the various laws in differ-
ent jurisdictions concerning the level of intent required to be convicted for carrying a con-
cealed weapon).
179. Begay, 553 U.S. at 141-42. In fact, only Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in Begay,
believed that driving under the influence did not create a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 153 (Scalia, J., concurring). All the other justices
believed that it did. Id. at 141-42 (majority opinion) and 156-57 (Alito, J., dissenting).
180. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1351.
181. The ACCA analyzes the violated statute to determine whether the crime was a
violent felony. Archer analyzed FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.01 (West 2010). Presently, there is a
circuit split on whether carrying a concealed handgun presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another. See supra Part 1. It would not be shocking if the circuits also
split on whether carrying concealed handgun violations contain the three Begay characte-
ristics.
182. Archer, 531 F.3d. at 1348.
183. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1350.
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Many states have different laws addressing carrying concealed
handguns, and it is uncertain whether courts will apply Begay in
the same fashion as the Archer court. 184 In addition, the Eleventh
Circuit was too quick to conclude that because driving under the
influence is not a violent felony, then carrying concealed handgun
is not a crime of violence. The Eleventh Circuit's analysis and ap-
plication of Begay was hasty in that the court agreed with argu-
ments that were contrary to Hall.185
VI. PROPOSAL OF AN EXTENSION OF THE MODIFIED CATEGORICAL
APPROACH THAT WILL FLEXIBLY PROVIDE FOR DETERMINATION OF
DANGEROUS ELEMENTS OF CARRYING CONCEALED HANDGUN
STATUTES
Presently, the modified categorical approach only applies when
more information is needed to determine if the statutory convic-
tion satisfies the generic offense. 186 Since carrying concealed fire-
arm statutes include a variety of possible offenses, 187 the court
should extend the modified categorical approach to all carrying
concealed firearm violations. Thus, information beyond the sta-
tute would be used to determine the dangerousness of the offense.
This extended categorical approach would allow the court to de-
termine the exact type of carrying concealed firearm violation and
whether it presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.
Generally, there are three ways to violate a concealed carrying
law. First, a legally licensed holder may commit a technical, strict
liability violation. 1881 For example, a person with a permit to carry
concealed handguns may be required to have the permit physically
on their person while carrying the handgun. 189 Thus, anyone car-
184. Compare 720 ILL. cOM-P. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1.6 (West 2010) (requiring the intent level
of "knowingly"), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.01 (lacking an intent requirement). This is
especially important because the Archer Court conceded that there is no intent requirement
in Florida's statute. Archer, 531 F.3d at 1348.
185. Compare Hall, 77 F.3d at 401-02 (holding that carrying a concealed handgun is an
active crime that poses a serious risk of potential injury to another), with Archer, 531 F.3d
at 1351-52 (holding that carrying a concealed handgun is not an active crime).
186. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.
187. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302(9) (a complicated statute regarding transpor-
tation of firearms in a car, which could innocently be violated by a generally law-abiding
gun owner or could be violated by an armed career criminal).
188. In Missouri, an example of a technical, strict liability violation is a person who
inadvertently walks within twenty-five feet of a polling station with a concealed handgun.
See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571. 107. 1(2) (West 2010).
189. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.050(1)(b) (West 2010)
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rying a concealed handgun without the permit is in violation of
the law. 190 The second way to violate carrying concealed laws is to
commit a firearms crime. Discharging a firearm while intoxicated
is an example of such an offense.191 The third way to violate a
concealed carrying law is to carry a handgun without a license to
do So. 192 Individuals with criminal motives or poor judgment who
have immediate access to a handgun are dangerous examples of
this third type of violation. 19 3
Through the extended categorical approach, courts should dis-
tinguish the first type of violation, a strict liability violation, from
the latter two types, which are active crimes and dangerous. Fur-
thermore, the latter two types of violations should count as violent
felonies due to the serious potential risk of physical injury to
another. This proposal falls within the concept of Begay's three
characteristics and the Court's reluctance to include strict liability
crimes within the AC CA. 194 With this approach, strict liability
crimes lacking intent-such as technical and negligent carrying
concealed handgun violations-are not violent felonies; however,
the purposeful, violent, and aggressive crimes are violent felo-
nies.'19 5
Many states already follow a system where different types of
carrying concealed handgun violations receive different punish-
ments. 196 For example, Missouri provides different punishments
190. Id. § 9.41.050(2)(b).
191. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.030(l)(5) (W~est 2003).
192. See id. § 571.030.1(1).
193. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
194. Begay, 553 U.S. at 148 (declaring that strict liability crimes are not similar enough
to the enumerated crimes because of the lack of intent). Specifically, this modified categor-
ical approach agrees with Begay because the carrying concealed handgun violations that
indicate purposeful, violent and aggressive conduct will be violent felonies. Id. Contrarily,
carrying concealed handgun violations arising from strict liability or negligence will not be
violent felonies. Id.
195. This proposed application of the modified categorical approach may be a current
trend in the law. Recently, Chambers v. United States held that failure to report for penal
confinement was not a violent felony. 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009). In concluding that failure
to report was not a violent felony, the Court noted that the statute at issue-720 ILL. COWP.
STAT ANN. 5/31-6(a) (West 2010)-was really a statute with two separate crimes: escape,
which is aggressive, and failure to report, which is passive. Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691-92.
The proposed modified categorical approach in Part VI uses the same technique by diffe-
rentiating the subsections of carrying concealed weapon statutes that are strict liability
from the subsections which are purposeful, violent, and aggressive. Although the Court
used this approach in Chambers, no court has used this new approach with carrying con-
cealed handgun convictions.
196. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.101(application for carrying concealed handgun
permit); § 571.030 (unlawful carrying of a concealed handgun); § 571.070 (unlawful carry-
ing of concealed handgun by especially dangerous persons); § 571. 107 (people authorized to
carry a concealed handgun and violate provisions of the permit);
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for different violations of carrying concealed handgun laws. In
Missouri, persons who carry concealed handguns without a permit
face a felony punishable up to four years. 197 Persons who have a
permit to carry concealed handguns and violate technical strict
liability rules of the permit face minor penalties and often simply
pay a fine.198 Persons deemed dangerous because of their criminal
history that illegally carry concealed handguns receive felonies
punishable by up to seven years.199
Pennsylvania also has two different punishments for unlawfully
carrying concealed handguns. Those who do not have a permit,
but are otherwise eligible to receive a permit, receive a lesser pu-
nishment than violators who do not have a permit and would be
unable to obtain a permit had they correctly applied for one.
200
Such legislation recognizes that certain individuals with a con-
cealed handgun are potentially more dangerous than others, and
certain carrying concealed handgun violations are more dangerous
than others.
Similar to state legislatures, courts should differentiate between
the different types of carrying concealed handgun violations to
determine whether the crime presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another. 20 1 The courts can use the categorical
approach to determine the specific elements of the carrying con-
cealed handgun conviction. 202 This would allow the court to ana-
lyze the statute as well as information such as the charging docu-
ment, the written plea agreement, a transcript of the plea collo-
quy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge that the
defendant assented to when the defendant entered a plea. 20 3 In
the case of the Missouri statutes, a court would be able to deter-
§ 558.011 (punishment).
197. See §§ 571.030, 558.011.
198. See § 571.107.
199. See §§ 571.070, 558.011.
200. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106(a)(1)(2) (West 2010).
201. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). When courts apply the categorical approach to
state statutes, they must analyze the elements of the concealed handgun statute for con-
duct that presents a serious potential risk of injury to another. See Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (stating that § 924 mandates the application of a formal categori-
cal approach).
202. There are many different elements within carrying concealed handgun statutes,
and the court should determine whether the defendant's conviction was for a violent or
strict liability aspect of the statute. See Cook, 26 F.3d at 509 (holding that prior conviction
for obstruction of justice was a violent felony under the ACCA). The Fourth Circuit looked
to extra information in addition to the conviction because it was unclear whether or not the
conviction was for one of force. Id. at 509.
203. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16.
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mine whether the conviction for carrying a concealed handgun
was based on a technical strict liability permit violation 04 or
another, more dangerous violation.205 Not all carrying concealed
handgun violations are the same; accordingly, determination of a
violent felony should differ based on the potential of injury.
This extended version of the categorical approach satisfies Tay-
lor, which requires courts to look to the elements of the statute
violated.206 In addition, this method satisfies the Begay characte-
ristics of not including strict liability and negligence based crimes
as violent felonies.207 There is a difference between a law-abiding
citizen inadvertently walking within five feet of a polling station
while carrying his licensed concealed handgun and a career crimi-
nal or mentally infirm person illegally obtaining a handgun and
carrying it for purpose of immediate use. It is because of these
differences that a court should use an extension of the categorical
approach when analyzing carrying concealed firearm offenses.
VII. AN AMENDMENT To FIX THE ACCA
The ACCA has fallen short of Congress's objectives and purpos-
es. Handguns are still accessible and are widely used in criminal
activities. 2o8 Even more frustrating, carrying a concealed handgun
is one of the most obvioids links between a criminal possessing a
firearm and using a firearm in the commission of a crime. There-
fore, the ACCA must uniformly punish carrying concealed hand-
gun violations, and an amendment is necessary to enable the
ACCA to punish habitual criminals that carry concealed hand-
guns.
A. The ACCA Has Not Prevented the Proliferation of Handguns
Presently, the ACCA does not achieve Congress's objectives
from the Gun Control Act of 1968 or the current AC CA.209 In
204. An example of a technical, strict liability permit violation is a person who inadver-
tently walks within twenty-five feet of a polling place. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571. 107 (West
2010).
205. An example of a more dangerous violation is a person who discharges a firearm
while intoxicated. See id. § 57 1.030.
206. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
207. See Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1588.
208. See Zawitz, supra note 13, at 3; see also Caroline Harlow, Firearm Use by Offenders
(NCJ.189369), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 2 (2001),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/i ndex.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=94.
209. See Huddleston , 415 U.S. at 824 (citing Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1201, 82 Stat. 236
(1968), as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 301(a)(1), 82 Stat. 1236 (1968) (codified at 18
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1968, Congress sought to stop the widespread ease through which
criminals could obtain firearms.210 Later, in an effort to stop ca-
reer offenders from using firearms, Congress severely punished
firearm crimes.211 At that point, Congress determined that the
ACCA targeted law-abiding gun dealers and gun owners, as op-
posed to dangerous criminals possessing firearms.212
Today, handguns are easily obtainable. And further steps are
required to deter criminals from using guns in their habitual,
criminal activities. 213 Although some criminals receive their guns
from dealers, nearly 80% of criminals receive their guns from the
black market. 214 The black market is evenly divided, as half of
these criminals receive guns from friends or family, and half re-
ceive guns from an illegal source. 215 Thus, regulating gun supply
alone has not stopped guns from reaching criminal hands.
Since criminals can easily obtain guns, the best way to resolve
this problem is harsher punishment for carrying and possessing
guns illegally. Criminals are deterred from a crime if a long pris-
on sentence is attached to it.216 Indeed, some of the criminals pur-
posefully avoid using guns because of increased prison sen-
tences.217 If prevention will not work, the next logical step is
strong enforcement of firearm laws.
U.S.CA. § 1201 (2006)) ("[Wlihen Congress enacted the provision .. , it was concerned with
the widespread traffic in firearms and with their general availability to those whose pos-
session thereof was contrary to the public interest."); see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, supra
note 33, at 2.
210. Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 824.
211. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3662.
212. 131 CONG. REC. H8951-02 (1985).
213. See Zawitz, supra note 13, at 3.
214. See Harlow, supra note 208.
215. Id.
216. See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE
EcONoNUsT EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTrHING 120 (2005) ("[Olne deterrent that
has proven moderately effective is a stiff increase in prison time for anyone caught in pos-
session of an illegal gun.").
217. Congressman Mollohan entered an article regarding Professor James Wright's
research. 131 CONG. REC. E3712-01 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985) (statement of Rep. Mollohan).
Professor Wright testified to his research:
MONITOR: What about mandatory penalties for criminal misuse of a firearm?
WRIGHT: We asked the men in our sample, who had never committed any firearm
related crimes, "Why not?" The possibility of getting a stiffer sentence for using a
firearm in crime figured very high in their reasoning.
Id.
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B. An Amendment to the ACCA that Uniformly Sentences Carry-
ing Concealed Handgun Convictions
There are many different variations of carrying concealed hand-
gun laws amongst the different states. Currently, there are only
thirteen states with sentence lengths punishing the crime in
excess of one year.218 Therefore, in thirty-seven states, the crimes
for carrying concealed handguns are not violent felonies under the
ACCA because they do not meet the threshold requirement of "pu-
nishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."2 19
In Taylor, the Supreme Court emphasized that if burglary was
not categorized as a generic crime there would be discrepancies
throughout the country in determining whether burglary is a vio-
lent felony.220 One of Taylor's main purposes was to ensure that
burglary is consistently held as a violent felony by the circuits,
even if states identify burglary differently. The problem identified
in Taylor may also arise with carrying concealed handguns be-
cause of the differing sentence lengths of state crimes. This is an
unsatisfactory result, and it frustrates the purposes of the ACCA.
It goes against Congress's intent, and it inconsistently punishes
conduct based upon the state in which the individual happened to
commit the crime.
Without an amendment to the ACCA, different states' arbitrary
punishment of a crime will result in different outcomes under the
ACCA. 221 Congress should amend the ACCA to resolve this prob-
lem and to achieve the purpose of uniformly preventing firearm
use and possession by criminals and other dangerous individuals.
An amendment with the following language would achieve these
objectives (proposed amendment in italics):
§ 924(e)(1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g)
of this title and has three previous convictions by any court
referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony
or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions dif-
ferent from one another, such person shall be fined under this
title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwith-
standing any other provision of law, the court shall not sus-
218. See Eriksen supra note 89, at 838.
219. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2006).
220. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590-91.
221. See id. at 590-92 (stating that Congress did not intend for varied results due to
different definitions of burglary).
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pend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to,
such persons with respect to the conviction under 922(g).
(2) As used in this sub section-
(A) the term "serious drug offense" means-. ..
(B) the term "violent felony" means any crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any
act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying
of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be
punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed
by an adult, that-
(i) has an element the use, attempted use, or threat-
ened use of physical force against the person of
another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another; and
(C) the term "conviction" includes a finding that a person
has committed an act of juvenile delinquency involving a
violent felony.
(D) for purposes of subsection (e) (2) (B) (ii), carrying a con-
cealed handgun violation need not be punishable in excess
of one year to qualify as a violent felony under the "other-
wise" clause of section 924(e) (2) (B) (ii).
This amendment exempts the violation of carrying concealed
handguns from the punishable in excess of one year requirement.
Therefore, every state's carrying concealed handgun statute would
be within the scope of the ACCA. This would allow application of
the extended categorical approach. As outlined previously in Part
VI, technical, strict liability violations would not be violent felo-
nies. Only dangerous firearm conduct and individuals carrying
concealed handguns without a permit would be violent felonies.
Also, this amendment does not conflict with the Assimilative
Crimes Act (ACA), because the ACA is applied only when the fed-
eral government prosecutes a state crime. Here, it is inapplicable
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because the concealed handgun statute is only for enhancement
purposes and not prosecution under the ACCA.222
This amendment creates a special exception for concealed hand-
gun statutes in that they need not be punishable by a term exceed-
ing one year. This exception is not spectacular or alarming. In-
deed, the definition of "crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year" includes special exceptions and exclu-
sions already. 223 Under these current exclusions, certain business
crimes fail the requirement of punishable in excess of one year.
This proposed amendment takes a similar approach. Here, in-
stead of excluding a business crime that normally would fall with-
in the definition, the amendment includes a dangerous crime that
normally would not meet the requirements of punishable in excess
of one year. Congress specifically excluded certain business
crimes from the definition because it believed white-collar busi-
ness crimes are not violent, and such criminals are not dangerous
in possession of a firearm. 224 Congress faced the predicament of
wanting to include crimes punishable by a certain length; howev-
er, Congress simultaneously wanted to exclude some of those very
crimes due to their non-relation to violence and firearms. It
worked around the problem by creating the exception for business
crimes.
222. The Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006) allows federal enclaves to
enforce state criminal laws. The proposed amendment does not provide for prosecution of
state concealed carry laws, which would deprive the defendant of civil rights. The proposed
amendment simply allows for a convicted felon to be sentenced to a longer sentence under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) based upon a prior carrying a concealed handgun conviction. This
conviction itself is not a felony because it does not deprive the defendant of civil rights. The
ACA will not be discussed in further detail because it is beyond the scope of this article.
223. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2006). "[Clrime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year" does not include offenses "pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair
trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of
business practices, or any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemea-
nor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less." Id.
224. United States v. Jester, 139 F.3d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998). The court noted:
Congress enacted § 922(g)(1) in order to keep firearms out of the hands of those per-
sons whose prior conduct indicated a heightened proclivity for using firearms to
threaten community peace . .. . Section 921(a)(20)(A) reduces unnecessary restric-
tions on the conduct of some felons who do not exhibit these dangerous tendencies. It
was perfectly reasonable for Congress to assume that violent felons would pose a
higher risk of endangering the public with a firearm than § 921(a)(20)(A)'s class of
exempted non-violent offenders.
Id. at 1171. Additionally, see, e.g., United States v. Stephens, No. 1:05-CR-87, 2006 WL
208576, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. 2006) (dictum) ("[it seems reasonable for Congress to believe
felons convicted of offenses related to the regulation of business practices are less likely to
misuse a gun than other felons convicted of non-violent crimes.").
635
636 ~Duquesne Law ReviewVo.4
Similarly, Congress should tweak the rules again. This time,
instead of excluding a business crime because of its non-violent
traits, it should include a dangerous crime because of its violent
and aggressive characteristics. The ACCA's purpose is to punish
dangerous and violent felons when they are in possession of a fire-
arm. The inclusion of all carrying concealed handgun crimes
furthers the ACCA's purpose because, unlike business crimes, car-
rying concealed handgun violations are dangerous and indicate a
higher likelihood of firearm use in the commission of a crime.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The ACCA is an important sentence enhancement statute, pro-
viding the federal government with the ability to incarcerate dan-
gerous persons illegally in possession of a handgun for longer sen-
tences. It is important for the interpretation and execution of the
statute to provide results that further Congress's intentions. One
of the main purposes of gun control legislation is to prevent dan-
gerous persons from possessing handguns. 225  The proposed
amendment to the ACCA works towards this purpose because it
strongly penalizes persons not allowed to possess firearms.
Carrying a concealed handgun is an inherently dangerous act.
And punishing violators of concealed handgun laws achieves Con-
gress's intentions. Persons who carry concealed handguns without
a permit present a serious potential risk of physical injury to oth-
ers because the carrier may very well be either a criminal or a
person with poor judgment. Public policy supports the notion that
deterring dangerous people from having immediate access to
handguns is in the best interest of society.
225. See supra note 209.
Vol. 48636
